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The beginnings of Indian Philosophy
take us very far back to about the
middle of the second millennium
before Christ. The speculative activity
begun so early was continued till a
century or two ago, so that the
history that is narrated in the
following pages covers a period of
over thirty centuries. During this
long period Indian thought
developed practically unaffected by
outside influence; and the extent as
well as the importance of its
achievements will be evident when it
is mentioned that it has evolved
several systems of philosophy, besides
creating a great national religion
Brahmanism, and a great world
religion Buddhism.
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delivered for many years at the
Mysore University. Its foremost aim
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far as possible within the limits of a
single volume, a comprehensive
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period, the early post-Vedic period
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PREFACE
THIS work is based upon the lectures which I delivered
for many years at the Mysore University and is published
with the intention that it may serve as a text-book for use
in colleges where Indian philosophy is taught. Though
primarily intended for students, it is hoped that the book
may also be of use to others who are interested in the Indian
solutions of familiar philosophical problems. Its foremost
aim has been to give a connected and, so far as possible
within the limits of a single volume, a comprehensive account
of the subject; but interpretation and criticism, it will be
seen, are not excluded. After an introductory chapter sum-
marizing its distinctive features, Indian thought is considered
in detail in three Parts dealing respectively with the Vedic
period, the early post-Vedic period and the age of the
systems; and the account given of the several doctrines in
each Part generally includes a brief historical survey in
addition to an exposition of its theory of knowledge, onto-
logy and practical teaching. Of these, the problem of know-
ledge is as a rule treated in two sections, one devoted to its
psychological aftd the other to its logical aspect. In the
preparation of the book, I have made use of the standard
works on the subject published in recent times; but, except
in two or three chapters (e.g. that on early Buddhism),
the views expressed are almost entirely based upon an
independent study of the original sources. My indebtedness
to the works consulted is, I trust, adequately indicated in
the footnotes. It was not possible to leave out Sanskrit
terms from the text altogether ; but they have been sparingly
used and will present no difficulty if the book is read from the
beginning and their explanations noted as they are given.
To facilitate reference, the number of the page on which a
technical expression or an unfamiliar idea is first mentioned
is added within brackets whenever it is alluded to in a later
portion of the book.
There are two points to which it is necessary to draw
attention in order to avoid misapprehension. The view taken
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here of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism is that it is
pure nihilism, but some are of opinion that it implies a
positive conception of reality. The determination of this
question from Buddhistic sources is difficult, the more so
as philosophic considerations become mixed with historical
ones. Whatever the fact, the negative character of its teach-
ing is vouched for by the entire body of Hindu and Jaina
works stretching back to times when Buddhism was still
a power in the land of its birth. The natural conclusion to
be drawn from such a consensus of opinion is that, in at
least one important stage of its development in India, the
Madhyamika doctrine was nihilistic; and it was not con-
sidered inappropriate in a book on Indian philosophy to
give prominence to this aspect of it. The second point is
the absence of any account of the Dvaita school of Vedantic
philosophy. The Vedanta is twofold. It is either absolu-
tistic or theistic, each of which again exhibits many forms.
Anything like a complete treatment of its many-sided
teaching being out of the question here, only two examples
have been chosen one, the Advaita of Samkara, to illustrate
Vedantic absolutism, and the other, the Vi&istadvaita of
Ramanuja, to illustrate Vedantic theism.
I have, in conclusion, to express my deep gratitude to
Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor of the Andhra
University, who has throughout taken a very kindly and
helpful interest in this work, and to Mr. D. Venkataramiah
of Bangalore, who has read the whole book and suggested
various improvements.
M. H.
August 1932
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INTRODUCTION
THE beginnings of Indian philosophy take us very far back
indeed, for we can clearly trace them in the hymns of the
Rgveda which were composed by the Aryans not long after
they had settled in their new home about the middle of the
second millennium before Christ. The speculative activity
begun so early was continued till a century or two ago, so that
the history that we have to narrate in the following pages
covers a period of over thirty centuries. During this long
period, Indian thought developed practically unaffected by
outside influence
;
and the extent as well as the importance
of its achievements will be evident when we mention that
it has evolved several systems of philosophy, besides
creating a great national religion Brahminism, and a great
world religion Buddhism. The history of so unique a
development, if it could be written in full, would be of
immense value; but our knowledge at present of early
India, in spite of the remarkable results achieved by
modern research, is too meagre and imperfect for it. Not
only can we not trace the growth of single philosophic ideas
step by step; we are sometimes unable to determine
the relation even between one system and another. Thus
it remains a moot question to this day whether the Saftkhya
represents an original doctrine or is only derived from
some other. This deficiency is due as much to our ignorance
of significant details as to an almost total lack of exact
chronology in early Indian history. The only date that
can be claimed to have been settled in the first one thou-
sand years of it, for example, is that of the death of
Buddha, which occurred in 487 B.C. Even the dates we
know in the subsequent portion of it are for the most part
conjectural, so that the very limits of the periods under
which we propose to treat of our subject are to be regarded
as tentative. Accordingly our account, it will be seen,
is characterized by a certain looseness of perspective. In this
connection we may also perhaps refer to another of its
drawbacks which is sure to strike a student who is familiar
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with Histories of European philosophy. Our account will
for the most part be devoid of references to the lives or
character of the great thinkers with whose teaching it is
concerned, for very little of them is now known. Speaking
of Udayana, an eminent Nyaya thinker, Cowell wrote: 1
'He shines like one of the fixed stars in India's literary
firmament, but no telescope can discover any appreciable
diameter; his name is a point of light, but we can detect
therein nothing that belongs to our earth or material exis-
tence/ That description applies virtually to all who were
responsible for the development of Indian thought; and
even a great teacher like Samkara is to us now hardly
more than a name. It has been suggested2 that this indiffer-
ence on the part of the ancient Indians towards the
personal histories of their great men was due to a realization
by them that individuals are but the product of their
times 'that they grow from a soil that is ready-made for
them and breathe an intellectual atmosphere which is not
of their own making.' It was perhaps not less the result of
the humble sense which those great men had of themselves.
But whatever the reason, we shall miss in our account the
biographical background and all the added interest which
it signifies.
If we take the date given above as a landmark, we may
divide the history of Indian thought into two stages. It
marks the close of the Vedic periods and the beginning of
what is known as the Sanskrit or classical period. To the
former belong the numerous works that are regarded by
the Hindus as revealed. These works, which in extent have
been compared to 'what survives of the writings of ancient
Greece,' were collected in the latter part of the period. If
we overlook the changes that should have crept into them
before they were thus brought together, they have been
1 Introduction to Kusum&njali (Eng. Translation), pp. v and vi.
SS. p. 2.
3 It is usual to state the lower limit of the Vedic period as 200 B.C.,
including within it works which, though not regarded as 'revealed*
(rutl), are yet exclusively concerned with the elucidation of revealed'
texts. We are here confining the term strictly to the period in which
Vedic works appeared.'
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preserved, owing mainly to the fact that they were held
sacred, with remarkable accuracy ; and they are consequently
far more authentic than any work of such antiquity can be
expected to be. But the collection, because it was made
chiefly, as we shall see, for ritualistic purposes, is incomplete
and therefore fails to give us a full insight into the character
of the thoughts and beliefs that existed then. The works
appear in it arranged in a way, but the arrangement is not
such as would be of use to us here; and the collection is from
our present standpoint to be viewed as lacking in system. As
regards the second period, we possess a yet more extensive
literature; and, since new manuscripts continue to be dis-
covered, additions to it are still being made. The information
it furnishes is accordingly fuller and more diverse. Much of
this material also appears in a systematized form. But this
literature cannot always be considered quite as authentic
as the earlier one, for in the course of long oral transmission,
which was once the recognized mode of handing down
knowledge, many of the old treatises have received additions
or been amended while they have retained their original
titles. The systematic treatises among them even in their
original form, do not carry us back to the beginning of the
period. Some of them are undoubtedly very old, but even
they are not as old as 500 B.C., to state that limit in round
numbers. It means that the post-Vedic period is itself to be
split up into two stages. If for the purpose of this book we
designate the later of them as 'the age of the systems/ we
are left with an intervening period which for want of a
better title may be described as 'the early post-Vedic period/
Its duration is not precisely determinable, but it lasted
sufficiently long from 500 B.C. to about the beginning of
the Christian era to be viewed as a distinct stage in the
growth of Indian thought. It marks a transition and its
literature, as may be expected, partakes of the character of
the literatures of the preceding and of the succeeding periods.
While it is many-sided and not fully authentic like its
successor, it is unsystematized like its predecessor.
Leaving the details of our subject, so far as they fall
within the scope of this work, to be recounted in the following
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chapters, we may devote the present to a general survey of
it. A striking characteristic of Indian thought is its richness
and variety. There is practically no shade of speculation
which it does not include. This is a matter that is often lost
sight of by its present-day critic who is fond of applying to
it sweeping epithets like 'negative' and 'pessimistic' which,
though not incorrect so far as some of its phases are con-
cerned, are altogether misleading as descriptions of it as a
whole. There is, as will become clear when we study our
subject in its several stages of growth, no lack of emphasis
on the reality of the external world or on the optimistic
view of life understood in its larger sense. The misconception
is largely due to the partial knowledge of Indian thought
which hitherto prevailed ; for it was not till recently thatworks
on Indian philosophy, which deal with it in anything like
a comprehensive manner, were published. The schools
of thought familiarly known till then were only a few;
and even in their case, it was forgotten that they do not
stand for a uniform doctrine throughout their history,
but exhibit important modifications rendering such whole-
sale descriptions of them inaccurate. The fact is that Indian
thought exhibits such a diversity of development that it
does not admit of a rough-and-ready characterization.
Underlying this varied development, there are two diver-
gent currents clearly discernible one having its source
in the Veda and the other, independent of it. We might
describe them as orthodox and heterodox respectively,
provided we remember that these terms are only relative
and that either school may designate the other as heter-
odox, claiming for itself the 'halo of orthodoxy.' The second
of these currents is the later, for it commences as a reaction
against the first ; but it is not much later since it manifests
itself quite early as shown by references to it even in the
Vedic hymns. It appears originally as critical and nega-
tive; but it begins before long to develop a constructive
side which is of great consequence in the history of Indian
philosophy. Broadly speaking, it is pessimistic and realistic.
The other doctrine cannot be described thus briefly, for
even in its earliest recorded phase it presents a very complex
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character. While for example the prevailing spirit of the
songs included in the Rgveda is optimistic, there is sometimes
a note of sadness in them as in those addressed to the
goddess of Dawn (Uas), which pointedly refer to the way
in which she cuts short the little lives of men. 'Obeying the
behests of the gods, but wasting away the lives of mortals,
Uas has shone forth the last of many former dawns and
the first of those that are yet to come.' 1 The characteristic
marks of the two currents are, however, now largely
obliterated owing to the assimilation or appropriation of
the doctrines of each by the other during a long period of
contact ; but the distinction itself has not disappeared and
can be seen in the Vedanta and Jainism, both of which are
still living creeds.
These two types of thought, though distinct in their origin
and general spirit, exhibit certain common features. We shall
dwell at some length upon them, as they form the basic
principles of Indian philosophy considered as a whole :
(i) The first of them has in recent times become the
subject of a somewhat commonplace observation, viz. that
religion and philosophy do not stand sundered in India.
They indeed begin as one everywhere, for their purpose is in
the last resort the same, viz. a seeking for the central
meaning of existence. But soon they separate and develop
on more or less different lines. In India also the differentia-
tion takes place, but only it does not mean divorce. This
result has in all probability been helped by the isolated devel-
opment of Indian thought already referred to,* and has
generally been recognized as a striking excellence of it. But
owing to the vagueness of the word 'religion/ we may easily
miss the exact significance of the observation. This word,
as it is well known, may stand for anything ranging from
what has been described as 'a sum of scruples which impede
Cf. RV. I. 124. 2.
1 We may perhaps instance as a contrast the course which thought
has taken in Europe, where the tradition of classical culture, which
is essentially Indo-European, has mingled with a Semitic creed.
Mrs. Rhys Davids speaks of science, philosophy and religion as being
'in an armed truce' in the West. See Buddhism (Home University
Library), p. 100.
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the free use of our faculties' to a yearning of the human spirit
for union with God. It is no praise to any philosophy to be
associated with religion in the former sense. Besides, some
Indian doctrines are not religion at all in the commonly
accepted sense. For example, early Buddhism was avowedly
atheistic and it did not recognize any permanent spirit. Yet
the statement that religion and philosophy have been one in
India is apparently intended to be applicable to all the doc-
trines. So it is necessary to find out in what sense of the word
the observation in question is true. Whatever else a religion
may or may not be, it is essentially a reaching forward to an
ideal, without resting in mere belief or outward observances.
Its distinctive mark is that it serves to further right living;
and it is only in this sense that we can speak of religion as one
with philosophy in India. 1 The ancient Indian did not stop
short at the discovery of truth, but strove to realize it in his
own experience. He followed up tattva-jnana, as it is
termed, by a strenuous effort to attain moka or liberation,*
which therefore, and not merely an intellectual conviction,
was in his view the real goal of philosophy. In the words of
Max Muller, philosophy was recommended in India 'not for
the sake of knowledge, but for the highest purpose that man
can strive after in this life. '3 The conception of moka varies
from system to system; but it marks, according to all,
the culmination of philosophic culture. In other words,
Indian philosophy aims beyond Logic. This peculiarity of
the view-point is to be ascribed to the fact that philosophy
in India did not take its rise in wonder or curiosity as it
seems to have done in the West; rather it originated under
the pressure of a practical need arising from the presence
of moral and physical evil in life. It is the problem of
how to remove this evil that troubled the ancient Indian
most, and moka in all the systems represents a state in
which it is, in one sense or another, taken to have been
overcome. Philosophic endeavour was directed primarily
1 Indian philosophy may show alliance with religion in other senses
also, but such alliance does not form a common characteristic of
all the doctrines.
Cf. NS. I. i. i. 3 SS. p. 370.
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to find a remedy for the ills of life, and the consideration
of metaphysical questions came in as a matter of course.
This is clearly indicated for instance by the designation
sometimes applied to the founders of the several schools
of Tirtha-kara' or Tirtham-kara/ which literally means
'ford-maker' and signifies one that has discovered the way
to the other shore across the troubled ocean of sarhsara.
But it may be thought that the idea of moksa, being
eschatological, rests on mere speculation and that, though
it may be regarded as the goal of faith, it can hardly be
represented as that of philosophy. Really, however, there is
no ground for thinking so, for, thanks to the constant presence
in the Indian mind of a positivistic standard, the moksa ideal,
even in those schools in which it was not so from the outset,
speedily came to be conceived as realizable in this life, and
described as jivan-mukti, or emancipation while yet alive.
It still remained, no doubt, a distant ideal; but what is
important to note is that it ceased to be regarded as some-
thing to be reached in a life beyond. Man's aim was no
longer represented as the attainment of perfection in a
hypothetical hereafter, but as a continual progress towards
it within the limits of the present life. Even in the case of
doctrines like the Nyaya-Vateesika 1 or the Viistadvaita*
which do not formally accept the jivan-mukti ideal, there is
clearly recognized the possibility of man reaching here
a state of enlightenment which may justifiably be so described
because it completely transforms his outlook upon the
world and fills with an altogether new significance the
life he thereafter leads in it. Such an ideal was already
part and parcel of a very influential doctrine in the latter
part of the Vedic period, for it is found in the Upanisads.
One of these ancient treatises says; 'When all the desires
the heart harbours are gone, man becomes immortal and
reaches Brahman here.'! It points beyorvd intellectual
satisfaction, which is often mistaken to be the <iim of philo-
sophy, and yet by keeping within the bounds of possible
human experience avoids the dogma of mok^a in the
i See NSB. IV. ii. 2; NV. I. i. i. ad finem.
See SB. IV. i. 13. 3 Katha Up. II. iii. 14.
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eschatological sense. The latter view also, known as videha-
mukti, has survived, but it is a relic from earlier times when
it was believed that the consequences of a good or bad life
led here were to be reaped elsewhere in a state beyond
death ; and the retention of it by any school does not really
affect its philosophic standpoint.
(ii) A necessary corollary to such a view of the goal of
philosophy is the laying down of a suitable course of
practical discipline for its attainment. Philosophy thereby
becomes a way of life, not merely a way of thought. It has
been remarked with reference to Jainism that its funda-
mental maxim is 'Do not live to know, but know to live' 1
and the same may well be said of the other Indian schools
also. 1 The discipline naturally varies in the two traditions;
but there is underlying it in both an ascetic spirit whose
inculcation is another common characteristic of all Indian
doctrines. 3 Suresvara, a famous disciple of Sarhkara,
remarks4 that, though systems of thought including heretical
ones like Buddhism may differ in the substance of their
theories, they are all at one in teaching renunciation. It
means that while agreeing with one another in regard to the
necessity of renunciation, they assign different reasons for it.
That the heretical systems which in general were pessimistic
should have commended absolute detachment is quite intelli-
gible, for they were pervaded by a belief in the vanity and
nothingness of life. What is specially noteworthy here is
that the orthodox schools also, some of which at least were
optimistic, should have done the same. But there is a very
important difference between asceticism as taught in the two
schools. The heterodox held that man should once for all
turn away from the world whatever his circumstances might
be. But the orthodox regarded the ascetic ideal as only to be
> OJ. p. 112.
* Compare in this connection Professor Whitehead's characterization
of Buddhism as 'the most colossal example in history of applied
metaphysics' : Religion in the Making, p. 39.
3 The Carvaka view is an exception ; but it is hardly a system of
philosophy in the form in which it is now known. See Ch. VIII.
4 BUY. pp. 513-15. st. 405-411.
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*t
progressively realized. As Dr. Winternitz observes, 1 it is in
their opinion to be approached 'only from the point of view
of the arama theory according to which the Aryan has
first to pass the state of Brahmacarin, the student of the
Veda, and of the householder (grhastha) who founds a family,
offers sacrifices and honours the Brahmanas, before he is
allowed to retire from this world as a hermit or an ascetic.'
The contrast between the two ideals is set forth in a striking
manner in a chapter of the Mahabharata known as the
'Dialogue between Father and Son.' 2 Here the father, who
represents the orthodox view, maintains that renunciation
should come at the end of the asrama discipline, but is won
over to his side by the son, who holds the view that it is the
height of unwisdom to follow amidst the many uncertainties
of life such dilatory discipline and pleads for an immediate
breaking away from all worldly ties. 3 That is, detachment
according to the former cannot be acquired without a
suitable preliminary training undergone in the midst of
society; but, according to the latter, it can be achieved at
once, any moment of disillusionment about the world
sufficing for it. The one believes social training to be indis-
pensable4 for the perfection of character; the other looks
upon it as more a hindrance than a help to it. But the social
factor, it should be added, is disregarded by the heterodox
only as a means of self-culture, and their attitude towards
it is neither one of revulsion nor one of neglect. For we know
as a matter of fact that they attached the greatest value to
society in itself and laid particular stress upon the need for
1
'Ascetic Literature in Ancient India* : Calcutta University Review
for October 1923, p. 3.
1 xii. 277.
3 This does not mean that there is no place for the laity in heterodox
society, but only that lay training is not viewed as obligatory before
one becomes a monk.
4 The rule relating to the discipline of the asramas was, as we shall
see in a subsequent chapter, much relaxed in later times by the
orthodox; but even thus the option to become an ascetic is to be
exercised only after one has passed through the first stage of
braruna-carya. It should also be stated that the relaxation, to judge
from current practice, is mostly in theory and that early renunciation
is the exception, not the rule.
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sympathy and kindness for fellow-men. There are other
differences as well such as the pursuit of ascetic morality by
the heterodox, as the sole mode of practical discipline, and by
the orthodox as only a preparation for a fresh course of
training which may itself be different in different schools.
But whatever the differences in matters of detail, asceticism
as such serves as a bond of union between the two traditions.
Even systems which do not at first appear to countenance it
are, as a little reflection will show, really favourable to it.
Thus ritualism with its promise of prosperity in a world
to come actually results in complete self-denial so far as
this world is concerned, because the fruit of the deeds it
prescribes is to be reaped not here, but elsewhere and amidst
conditions totally different from those of the present life.
The principle of detachment implicit in such doctrines was,
as we shall see, rendered explicit, and even the ulterior motive
of self-love which is involved in striving for reward hereafter
was eliminated by the Gita with its teaching of disinterested
action.
Owing to the spirit of renunciation that runs through them
all, the way of life which the Indian doctrines prescribe
may be characterized as aiming at transcending morality as
commonly understood. In other words, the goal of Indian
philosophy lies as much beyond Ethics as it does beyond
Logic. As however the rationale of the ascetic ideal is
explained in two different ways by Indian thinkers, the
supermoral attitude bears a somewhat different significance
in the several schools; but this distinction does not, like the
previous one, correspond to the division into orthodox
and heterodox traditions. Some schools admit the ultimacy
of the individual self while others deny it in one sense or
another. Buddhism for example altogether repudiates the
individual self as a permanent entity, while Absolutism
takes it as eventually merging in the true or universal self
so that its individuality is only provisional. Theism on the
other hand like that of Ramanuja and pluralistic systems
like Jainism or the Nyay-Vaiesika recognize the indi-
vidual self to be ultimate, but point out that the way to
deliverance lies only through the annihilation of egoism
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(aham-kara). Now according to the systems which deny the
individual self in one form or another, the very notion
of obligation ceases to be significant finally, the contrast
between the individual and society upon which that notion
is based being entirely negated in it. Referring to a person
that has attained to such a super-individual outlook, the
Taittiriya Upani?ad says 1 : 'He is not troubled by thoughts
like these: Have I not done the right? Have I done the
wrong?' In the other systems which admit the ultimacy of
the individual self but teach the necessity for absolute self-
suppression, the consciousness of obligation continues, bt
the disciple devotes himself to its fulfilment with no thought
whatsoever of his rights. That is, though the contrast
between the individual and society is felt, that between
rights and duties disappears; and so far, the motive is
lifted above that of common morality. According to both
the views, the essential duality of the moral world is tran-
scended on account of the total renunciation of personal
interest; in neither is it merely an adjustment, however
difficult or delicate, of rights and duties between the
individual and his social environment.
There is a sense, we may add, in which the practical
training, even in its preliminary stages, may be said to aim
at transcending morality as ordinarily conceived. The indi-
vidual's obligations, according to the Indian view, are not
confined to human society, but extend to virtually the whole
of sentient creation. To the common precept 'Love thy
neighbour as thyself,' it adds, as has been observed by one
than whom nobody now is better fitted to interpret the Indian
ideal of life, 'And every living being is thy neighbour.' 2 Such
an extension of the world of moral action accords well with
the spirit of Indian ethics whose watchword is devotion to
duties rather than assertion of rights. Beings that are not
characterized by moral consciousness may have no duties to
fulfil, but it does not mean that there is none to be fulfilled
towards them. This ideal of the fellowship of all living beings
is best illustrated by the principle of non-injury (ahimsa),
which forms an integral part of every one of the higher Indian
1
ii. 9. a See Remain Holland: Mahatma Gandhi, p. 33.
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faiths and was practised not only by saints and sages, but also
by emperors like ASoka. It may minimize the importance of
human society. That is because the ideal has not less regard
for it but more for the wider whole which comprehends all
animate being. It does not thereby ignore the spirit of human
unity. Only it conceives of that spirit as consisting not in
striving for human well-being alone, but also in discharging
towards all living creatures the obligation corresponding to
the position of privilege which mankind occupies in the
scheme of the universe. Social morality, however much it may
widen our outlook from the individual's standpoint, really
keeps us isolated from the rest of creation. In addition to
personal egoism, there is what may be called the egoism
of the species which leads inevitably to the belief that the
sub-human world may be exploited for the benefit of man.
That also must be got rid of, if man is to become truly free ;
and he will do so only when he has risen above the anthropo-
centric view and can look upon everything as equally
sacred whether it be, in the words of the Gita, 1 'a cow or
elephant or dog, the cultured Brahmin or the outcaste that
feeds on dogs.'
These are the two elements common to all Indian thought
the pursuit of moksa as the final ideal and the ascetic
spirit of the discipline recommended for its attainment. They
signify that philosophy as understood in India is neither
mere intellectualism nor mere moralism, but includes and
transcends them both. In other words it aims, as already
stated, at achieving more than what Logic and Ethics can.
But it must not be forgotten that, though not them-
selves constituting the end, these are the sole means of
approach to it. They have been represented as the two wings
that help the soul in its spiritual flight. The goal that is
reached through their aid is characterized on the one hand
by jnana or illumination which is intellectual conviction
that has ripened into an immediate experience and, on the
other, by vairagya or self-renunciation which is secure by
reason of the discovery of the metaphysical ground for it.
It is pre-eminently an attitude of peace which does not
* v. 18.
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necessarily imply passivity. But the emphasis is on the
attitude itself or on the inward experience that gives rise to
it, rather than on the outward behaviour which is looked
upon as its expression and therefore more or less secondary.
The value of philosophic training lies as little in inducing a
person to do what otherwise he would not have done, as in
instructing him in what otherwise he would not have known ;
it consists essentially in making him what he was not before.
Heaven, it has been remarked, is first a temperament and
then anything else.
We have so far spoken about the main divisions of Indian
tradition, which, though exhibiting certain common features,
are fundamentally different. The history of Indian philo-
sophy is the history of the ways in which the two tradi-
tions have acted and reacted upon each other, giving rise to
divergent schools of thought. Their mutual influence,
however much desirable as the means of broadening the basis
of thought, has led to a considerable overlapping of the two
sets of doctrines, rendering it difficult to discover what ele-
ments each has incorporated from the other. It is impossible,
for instance, to say for certain to which of the two traditions
we owe the ideal of jivan-mukti to whose importance we
have drawn attention. In the course of this progressive
movement, now one school and now another was in the
ascendant. The ascendancy at one stage belonged conspicu-
ously to Buddhism, and it seemed as if it had once for all
gained the upper hand. But finally the Vedanta triumphed.
It has naturally been transformed much in the process,
although its inner character remains as it was already fore-
shadowed in the Upanisads. We may indeed regard the
several phases in the history of the heretical tradition as
only so many steps leading to this final development. The
Vedanta may accordingly be taken to represent the
consummation of Indian thought, and in it we may truly
look for the highest type of the Indian ideal. On the
theoretical side, it stands for the triumph of Absolutism and
Theism, for whatever differences may characterize the
various Vedantic schools, they are classifiable under these
two heads. The former is monistic and the latter, though
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avowedly pluralistic, may also be said to be governed by the
spirit of monism owing to the emphasis it places on the
entire dependence of everything on God. On the practical
side, the triumph of the Vedanta has meant the triumph of
the positive ideal of life. This is shown not only by the social
basis of the ethical discipline which the Vedanta as an ortho-
dox doctrine commends, but also by its conception of the
highest good which consists, as we shall see when we come
to consider the several systems in detail, not in isolating the
self from its environment as it does for the heterodox schools
but in overcoming the opposition between the two by identi-
fying the interests of the self with those of the whole. Both
ideals alike involve the cultivation of complete detachment ;
but the detachment in the case of the Vedanta is of a higher
and finer type. Kalidasa, who, as the greatest of Indian poets,
may be expected to have given the truest expression to the
ideal of practical life known to the Indians, describes it 1
as
'owning the whole world while disowning oneself.' The
Vedantic idea of the highest good also implies the recog-
nition Of a cosmic purpose, whether that purpose be conceived
as ordained by God or as inherent in the nature of Reality
itself, towards whose fulfilment everything consciously or
unconsciously moves. The heretical schools, except in so far
as they have been influenced by the other ideal, do not see
any such purpose in the world as a whole, though they
admit the possibility of the individual freeing himself from
evil.
1 Malavikdgnimitra, i. i.
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